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Abstract
Theoretically, a risk avers consumer takes a deductible if the premium rebate (far) exceeds his/her
expected out-of-pocket expenditures. In the absence of risk equalization, insurers are able to offer high
rebates because those who select into a deductible plan have below-average expenses. This paper shows
that, for high deductibles, such rebates cannot be offered if risk equalization would “perfectly” adjust for
the effect of self selection. Since the main goal of user charges is to reduce moral hazard, some effect of
self selection on the premium rebate can be justified to increase the viability of voluntary deductibles.
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Does risk equalization reduce the viability of voluntary deductibles? 
ABSTRACT: Theoretically, a risk avers consumer takes a deductible if the premium rebate (far) 
exceeds his/her expected out-of-pocket expenditures. In the absence of risk equalization,
insurers are able to offer high rebates because those who select into a deductible plan have 
below-average expenses. This paper shows that, for high deductibles, such rebates cannot be 
offered if risk equalization would “perfectly” adjust for the effect of self selection. Since the main 
goal of user charges is to reduce moral hazard, some effect of self selection on the premium 
rebate can be justified to increase the viability of voluntary deductibles.
Keywords: health insurance; voluntary deductibles; moral hazard; risk aversion; self selection;
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1. Introduction
In a number of health insurance schemes the insured can opt for a voluntary deductible in return 
for a premium rebate. The main goal of these deductibles is to reduce moral hazard. The extent to 
which this goal will be achieved is greatly affected by the number of insured choosing a deductible. 
Obviously, this number is positively correlated with the rebate offered by insurers and negatively 
correlated with the rebate demanded by the insured. 
In free, unregulated health insurance markets insurers can offer high rebates due to the effect of 
self selection. Self selection occurs because, within a premium-risk group, low-risk individuals have a 
greater incentive to opt for a deductible than high-risk individuals. However, in an increasing number 
of countries there is a system of risk equalization in which insurers receive a payment for the 
relatively high risks in their insurance pool and contribute a payment for the relatively low risks. To 
some extent, these equalization payments will adjust for differences in health status between the 
insured who choose a deductible and those who do not. The goal of this paper is to indicate whether 
the rebates offered in the absence of (perfect) risk equalization, can still be offered in the presence of
“perfect” risk equalization. If the answer is negative then the viability of voluntary deductibles will be 
reduced, i.e. numbers of insured opting for a deductible will be lower. Consequently, moral hazard 
reductions will be smaller. In this context, “perfect” risk equalization refers to an equalization system 
fully adjusting for the effect of self selection. The rationale of this paper is that countries like 
Switzerland and the Netherlands tend to improve risk equalization and consider voluntary deductibles 
as an appropriate instrument to reduce moral hazard. 
We analyzed panel data from Switzerland with information on expenditures and actual choice of 
deductible of 134,758 Swiss insured. Theoretically, risk avers insured take a deductible only if the 
premium rebate (far) exceeds their expected out-of-pocket expenditures, i.e. if they expect to obtain a 
financial gain. In the first step of the analysis we estimated the actual financial gain (i.e. premium 
rebate minus out-of-pocket expenditures) obtained by the group of insured with voluntary deductible 
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2
d  in 2003. In the second step we examined whether the rebate actually offered for d  could have 
been offered in the presence of “perfect” risk equalization.
Prior to the empirical results, we theoretically consider (the composition of) both the demanded
and offered premium rebate. Section 2 is concerned with the demanded premium rebate and uses the 
expected-utility model to show why risk avers consumers take a deductible only if they expect to 
obtain a financial gain. Section 3 is concerned with the offered premium rebate and considers in more 
detail how this rebate will be reduced by improvements in the risk equalization system. Section 4 
describes the data used, followed by a discussion of the methods in Section 5 and a report of the 
results in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this study and discusses some policy implications.
2. Demanded premium rebate
If an expected-income optimizing consumer with mandatory health insurance would be risk 
neutral and would face no transaction costs then he/she would take a deductible if the premium rebate 
exceeded the product of the possible losses hz,...z,z 21  and the probabilities hp,...p,p 21  of these 
losses to occur. The possible loss hz  equals the costs of health intervention h  that have to be paid
out-of-pocket. The maximum value of hh
n
pz¦
1
 equals the deductible amount d , since the 
expenditures above this amount are reimbursed by the insurer. 
In both economics and psychology it is widely argued that individuals consider more than (just)
the expected value hh pz6 in making choices under uncertainty. Arguing that a gain of 200 is not 
necessarily ‘worth’ twice as much as a gain of 100, Daniel Bernoulli and Gabriel Cramer 
hypothesized that an individual evaluates choices under uncertainty by the expected utility 
)pz(UU hh  instead of the expected value (von Neumann and Morgernstern, 1944). In existing 
literature the von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility model is widely used to model the demand 
for insurance. Since the demand for deductibles is in fact the opposite of the demand for insurance, 
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3
the model can also be used to consider the choice whether to take a deductible, starting from full 
coverage. In the following two sections we assume the consumer to be risk avers. Notice that the 
context of this study is mandatory health insurance, in which individuals are obliged to insure. 
Theoretically, these insured are not necessarily risk averters; they could be risk lovers. Nonetheless, it 
is doubtful whether consumers are risk loving in the context of health insurance. 
Similar to existing literature on the demand for health insurance, the expected-utility model used 
here does not take into account moral hazard. We further assume that individuals face no transaction 
costs in case of switching from a non-deductible to a deductible plan or the other way around. The 
role of transaction costs will be discussed in Section 2.3.
2.1 Expected-utility theory and the demand for insurance
According to the expected-utility model, the utility function of a risk avers consumer is 
characterized by a diminishing marginal utility of income, as shown in figure 1. If the consumer is 
assumed to have income Io  corresponding to utility )Io(U , and if the probability to incur medical 
expenditures z  equals p  and the probability to have no medical expenditures equals p1 , then
his/her expected income equals )I(E , ceteris paribus.
z*pIoIo*)p()zIo(*p)I(E   1  (1)
Accordingly, the consumer’s expected utility in a situation without insurance equals ))I(U(E , as 
shown in figure 1.
))zIo(U)Io(U(*p)Io(U)Io(U*)p()zIo(U*p))I(U(E   1 (2)
[Figure 1]
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4
At a certain moment the consumer is offered an insurance police for an actuarially fair premium 
)I(EI 0 . This insurance policy takes away the uncertainty about whether and when there will be 
an income loss because of medical expenditures z . Consequently, the actual utility of income after 
paying the actuarially fair premium )I(EI 0  is higher than the expected utility ))I(U(E  in a 
situation without insurance. The utility gain of this insurance policy equals D-C, as shown in figure 2.
[Figure2]
So, a rationally behaving risk avers consumer will always purchase insurance for an actuarially 
fair premium. Moreover, he/she will also buy insurance for a higher premium, as long as the loading 
fee does not exceed C-E. The maximum acceptable loading fee can be defined as the maximum 
amount that the insured is willing to pay for insurance, apart from the actuarially fair premium. 
2.2 Expected-utility theory and the demand for voluntary deductibles
In case of voluntary deductibles in mandatory health insurance we must go the other way around 
to approach the minimum compensation minC  demanded by an insured to be induced to take a 
deductible. Let us assume that )I(U  in figure 3 is the utility curve of a risk avers consumer with a 
mandatory policy with full coverage and income Io  (after the insurance premium). Notice that this 
starting point differs from that in the previous section.
At a certain moment, the consumer is offered the possibility to take a deductible d  in return for 
an actuarially fair premium rebate PR  that equals his/her expected out-of-pocket expenditures. We 
assume p  to be the probability of medical expenditures to exceed d  and assume p1  to be the 
probability of medical expenditures to be zero. For reasons of simplicity, the probability to incur 
medical expenditures in between is assumed to be zero. Accordingly, the actuarially fair premium 
rebate PR equals d*p . Consequently, having a deductible results in income dPRIo   if 
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medical expenditures exceed the deductible amount and results in income PRIo   if medical 
expenditures are zero, as shown in figure 3. The expected income )(IEd  in case of a deductible with 
an actuarially fair premium rebate equals:
Io)PRIo(*)p()dPRIo(*p)I(Ed   1 (3)
Expected utility ))I(U(Ed  is lower than )Io(U  since the consumer is a risk averter and a 
deductible plan results in more uncertainty about the level of income than full insurance. 
)PRIo(U*)p()dPRIo(U*p))I(U(Ed  1  (4)
[Figure 3]
To induce insured the consumer to take a deductible, the insurer has to increase the premium 
rebate with compensation C  such that ))I(U(Ed  equals or exceeds )Io(U , as shown in figure 4. 
We define the minimum compensation minC , such that ))I(U(Ed  equals )Io(U . So, the minimum 
compensation is in fact the opposite of the maximum loading fee discussed in Section 2.1. Whereas a 
risk avers consumer is willing to pay a loading fee for an insurance policy, he/she demands a 
compensation to be induced to take a deductible. As shown in figure 4, C  increases both 
dPRIo   and PRIo  , resulting in a higher expected income and a higher expected utility in case 
of a deductible. 
[Figure 4]
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In a study on the (hypothetical, survey-) choice whether to take a deductible among the Dutch 
privately insured, Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) found that, for all deductible amounts included, 
the premium rebate was about 80 percent higher than the actuarially fair rebate. This implies that 
these insured would demand for a rebate nearly twice the expected out-of-pocket expenditures before 
they would be willing to take a deductible.
2.3 Expected compensation
Among others, Edwards (1955), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Machina (1982), Fishburn 
(1983) argue that choices under uncertainty are not only influenced by risk aversion, but also by 
individual preferences and perceptions about both probabilities and prices. Burrows et al. (1993) 
report of inertia as being an important explanation for the fact that people are not switching in 
situations where this would benefit them in terms of (expected) utility. Kunreuter and Pauly (2004) 
argue that decisions are not always ‘optimal’ in terms of expected utility as a result of search and 
transaction costs, which occur as a consequence of searching for the best policy and switching from 
the current policy to a new one. Insured probably have greater inclination to switch between two 
policies in a situation where these costs are low than in a situation where these costs are high, ceteris 
paribus.
Following both this literature and the basic assumptions underlying the expected utility model, the 
demanded compensation is probably affected by a mixture of factors, such as the expected out-of-
pocket expenditures, the deductible amount d , the level of risk aversion r  (Pratt, 1964), the level of 
income I , the extent of transaction and search costs, and personal characteristics such as inertia. We 
do not explore these individual components in further detail, since the remainder of this paper is
focused on the total demanded compensation regardless of its composition. 
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2.4 Conclusion
According to the previous consideration we assume insured i to take a voluntary deductible d  if 
the offered premium rebate OPR  exceeds his/her demanded premium rebate DPR .
dd,i OPRDPR  (5)
with d,iDPR  as the sum of the expected out-of-pocket expenditures d,i)OOPE(E  and the minimum 
compensation diC ,min, .
dididi COOPEEDPR ,min,,, )(  (6)
3. Offered premium rebate
In a free, unregulated health insurance market the offered premium rebate OPR for a certain 
deductible can be based on out-of-pocket expenditures, reductions in moral hazard, reductions in 
administration costs, and the effect of self selection, due to that deductible (Bakker et al., 2000).
3.1 Out-of-pocket expenditures and cost reductions
The insured with a deductible pay the expenditures up to the deductible amount out of their own 
pocket, resulting in a shift of costs from the insurer to the insured. In a competitive health insurance 
market, insurers will be forced to reflect these out-of-pocket expenditures in the premium rebate.
A second component is the reduction in moral hazard. Moral hazard can be defined as the increase 
in (more expensive) medical consumption because of insurance. Based on the RAND-experiment, 
Keeler et al. (1988) conclude that full insurance coverage leads to about 70 percent higher medical 
expenditures than no insurance coverage. So, compared to full coverage, deductibles are expected to 
reduce total expenditures. In the RAND experiment a 95-percent coinsurance plan with a stop-loss of 
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$ 1,000 resulted in 31 percent lower medical expenditures than a full-coverage plan (Manning, 1987). 
The average medical expenditures of those not having a deductible in the RAND-experiment were $
749 (in 1984 US-dollars). A more recent study by Van Vliet (2004) shows that in the Dutch private 
health insurance market of 1996 a deductible of Dfl. 1,750 led to a reduction in medical expenditures
of about 14 percent. The average expected medical expenditures of the insured having that deductible 
were Dfl. 2,548 (in 1996 Dutch guilders).
In a reimbursement scheme, a third component could be a reduction in administration costs. Part 
of the insured will not send their bills to the insurer before the total amount exceeds the deductible. 
Consequently, the insurer does not have to handle the bills of those whose expenditures remain below 
the deductible amount in the accounting period. However, many health insurance schemes are 
characterized by arrangements between insurers and providers of care. Due to these arrangements a 
reduction in administration costs is expected to be negligible since (a part of) the bills are sent 
directly from the provider to the insurer, with the insured being notified afterwards. Hence, we 
assume a reduction in administration costs to be absent.
3.2 Self selection
In a competitive health insurance market without risk equalization, the premium rebate is not just 
a reflection of out-of-pocket expenditures and the cost reductions mentioned above, but also 
comprises the effect of self selection. Self selection occurs because high risks have a greater incentive 
to buy (more) insurance coverage than low risks within the same premium-risk group. Many studies 
found evidence of self selection in health insurance (e.g. Browne 1992, Gardiol et al. 2005, Beck 
2004). In the context of the present study, self selection occurs because the healthy insured have a 
greater incentive to opt for a voluntary deductible than the unhealthy insured (given a certain 
premium rebate). In a heterogeneous risk pool self selection results in market segmentation such that 
those who choose the deductible on average are healthier and have lower expenditures than those who 
do not choose a deductible, ceteris paribus. Competition will force the insurer to increase the 
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premium for full coverage and decrease the premium (i.e. increase the premium rebate) for the 
deductible plan. Consequently, the premium rebate for a certain deductible is not only based on out-
of-pocket expenditures plus the reduction in moral hazard due to that deductible, but also on 
differences in ex-ante health status between those whose choose a deductible and those who do not. 
The more heterogeneous premium-risk groups are the larger will be this effect of self selection.
In the presence of risk equalization among insurers, the effect of self selection on the premium 
rebate will be smaller. If the equalization payments do “perfectly” adjust for expenditure differences 
due to differences in ex-ante health status between the healthy and the unhealthy then the effect of self 
selection on the premium rebate is zero (although there might be substantial self selection). For 
instance, this scenario occurs if the level of deductible is included as a risk factor in the risk 
equalization system.
3.3 Conclusion
If the equalization payments fully adjust for the effect of self selection then the offered premium 
rebate can be based exclusively on the expected out-of-pocket expenditures )OOPE(E d , and 
expenditure reductions dMR  due to decreased moral hazard.
ddd MROOPEEOPR  )( (7)
4. Data
To estimate the actual financial gains obtained in the Swiss basic health insurance and to examine 
whether the premium rebates actually offered could have been offered in the presence of perfect risk 
equalization, we analyzed 2003-data from a Swiss sickness fund.
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4.1 Swiss sickness fund insurance
Since the Revised Health Insurance Law came into force in January 1996, all Swiss residents must 
have basic health insurance.
4.1.1 General
In 2002, there were 93 insurance companies operating under the health insurance law, which 
defines the scope of the benefits package as well as the conditions under which insurers and providers 
of care are operating. Among others, the package includes inpatient and outpatient care, physician’s 
services, physiotherapy, laboratory analyses, health care at home, nursing home care, technical aid, 
medicaments from pharmacy and physicians, and alternative and complementary benefits. Insurers 
are obliged to accept all applicants, thereby avoiding explicit preferred-risk selection in principle. The 
insured may change insurer twice per year. To equal out different starting positions of the competing 
insurers when open enrollment started in 1996 and to avoid preferred-risk selection, government 
created a solidarity fund responsible for risk equalization (Beck et al., 2003). Every canton has its 
own risk equalization system, which takes into account age and gender and equalizes the actual net 
expenditures, i.e. the expenditures reimbursed by the insurer. 
4.1.2 Individual deductibles
There are user charges in the form of individual deductibles starting from a mandatory minimum. 
The insured can reduce their premium by opting for a higher deductible. In order to protect solidarity, 
premium rebate limits are set by the federal government. In addition to these deductibles there is a 
coinsurance of 10 percent up to a maximum of CHF 600 per person per year for all medical 
expenditures above the deductible. During inpatient care those from single-occupant households must 
pay hotel-type expenses of CHF 10 per day. During the years in our data the mandatory deductible 
was CHF 230 and the voluntary deductibles on top of the mandatory deductible were CHF 170, 370, 
970 and 1,270 per person per year. A voluntary deductible of CHF 170 (€ 110, 2006) resulted in a 
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premium rebate of up to 8 percent. For voluntary deductibles of CHF 370, 970 and 1,270 (€ 235, € 
610 and € 800 respectively, 2006) the rebates were at most 15, 30 and 40 percent of the community-
rated premium per insurer per canton, respectively. Children are exempted from mandatory 
deductibles and their voluntary deductible options are all lower then the options for adults and seldom 
chosen.
4.2 Data
The data are taken from administrative sources and contain background information and medical 
expenditures for insured from 4 Swiss cantons who were enrolled in the sickness fund in 1998. These 
insured, all older than 26 years, were followed during the period 1998-2003, starting with n=197,120 
and ending up with n=134,758. The main reasons for drop-out were leaving to another region or 
leaving the country, switching to another insurance company and deaths. The data set includes 
information on age, gender, medical expenditures, insurance premium, deductible level, premium 
rebate, region and years of enrollment. Medical expenditures are divided into eleven categories of 
medical care, i.e. physician care, medicaments from physicians, medicaments from pharmacies, 
physiotherapy, laboratory analyses, stationary and ambulatory hospital care, health care at home, 
nursing home care, technical aid, and other. Apart from nursing home care, this benefit package is 
comparable to that in other health insurance schemes. To generalize the results and conclusions, 
expenditures for nursing home care were not taken into account in the empirical analysis.
The first line of table 1 shows the gross expenditures, i.e. the expenditures registered by the 
insurer, per deductible amount. These expenditures are probably incomplete because of unfiled 
claims. The reason is that some of the insured will send their bills to their insurer only if the total 
amount exceeds the deductible, i.e. if they expect to get any reimbursement. Obviously, the amount of 
unfiled claims is expected to increase with a higher deductible.
To get a better indication of the expenditure differences among insured with different deductible 
amounts, table 1 also shows the average expenditures above CHF 1,500 and the proportion of insured 
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with expenditures exceeding CHF 1,500. These expenditures are not affected by unfiled claims, since 
all insured with expenditures exceeding CHF 1,500, in principle, send all bills to the insurer in order 
to get (some) reimbursement. For these insured the gross expenditures registered by the insurance 
company reflect to their actual expenditures.
[Table 1]
At first glance, table 1 reveals that there is a high correlation between the level of deductible and 
expenditures > CHF 1,500. This can be the result of both a reduction in moral hazard and the effect of 
self selection. Self selection is evident in the correlation between the level of deductible and age.
5. Method
In the first part of the empirical analysis we quantified the actual financial gain obtained for 
voluntary deductible d  in 2003. In the second part we examined whether the premium rebate offered 
for deductible d could have been offered in the presence of “perfect” risk equalization.
5.1 The actual financial gain
For insured i  we calculated the actual financial gain d,iC  from having a voluntary deductible d
as the offered premium rebate for this deductible, dOPR , minus his/her out-of-pocket expenditures 
diOOPE ,  due to this deductible. Obviously, d,iC  can also be a financial loss instead of a financial 
gain.
diddi OOPEOPRC ,,  (8)
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The data set contains information on the actual rebates for different deductible plans, but lacks 
some information on expenditures for the insured whose expenditures did not exceed the deductible 
amount, as mentioned in Section 4.2. To correct for unfiled claims we used the following three-step 
procedure:
A) estimate an expenditure model on the group of insured without a voluntary deductible;
B) predict the expenditures of the insured with a voluntary deductible by combining their 
characteristics with the coefficients obtained in A;
C) calculate the expected out-of-pocket expenditures using the results of B.
5.2 Expected expenditures
Expenditures of the insured without a voluntary deductible were assumed to be recorded in full. 
This seems to be reasonable since only 18 percent of these insured had expenditures below the 
mandatory deductible of CHF 230 and only 12 percent had no expenditures recorded at all. To 
estimate the total expenditures i)Y(E  we used the two-part model defined in equation (9). 
)Y|Y(E*)Y(p)Y(E iiii 00 !! (9)
We estimated )Y(p i 0!  by a logistic regression. For the estimation of the second part of 
equation (9), we considered two options. The first, described by Duan et al. (1983), is applying OLS 
to the logarithm of positive medical expenditures. An important disadvantage of this option with 
regard to our analysis is that the predictions need to be retransformed to monetary units. The second 
option is GLM with a log-link and a choice of distributions. We chose to use this option since the 
predictions do not need to be retransformed and a distribution can be chosen that fits the data in a 
proper way (Manning and Mullahy, 2001). The distribution chosen in our analysis reflects how the 
variance is related to the mean. As will be described below, i)Y(E  and its variance were finally used 
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to estimate the out-of-pocket expenditures that concentrate in the left-tail of the distribution. Testing a 
normal, log-normal, Poisson and Gamma distribution revealed that Gamma is the best in estimating 
the out-of-pocket expenditures in our data. The fit will be illustrated later on. For the estimation of 
both the first and the second part of equation (9) the following information was used to create the 
explanatory variables: age, gender, region and gross expenditures in three previous years. Dummy
variables were created to represent 14 age/gender groups, and 9 different regions, and continuous 
variables were created for the log(gross expenditures +1) in years  1t , 2t  and 3t  separately 
for the 10 categories of medical care mentioned in Section 4.2.
As a next step, the coefficients obtained were used to predict the expenditures of the insured with
a voluntary deductible. For these insured the predicted expenditures were - a fraction 0)d(F - higher
than the gross expenditures recorded in the data. Theoretically, this discrepancy can be the effect of 
moral hazard, unfiled claims, and unobserved differences in health status. However, unobserved 
differences in health status are expected to be insignificant, since differences in health and risk are 
sufficiently captured by including prior expenditures of three preceding years in our model,
differentiated as well into ten types of expenditures. In the remainder of the analysis unobserved 
differences in health status are assumed to be absent. Accordingly, the expected expenditures can be 
seen as the expenditures that these insured would have had in a situation without a voluntary 
deductible.
During the years in our data, the deductible levels did not change. So, given 0)(dF , the gross
expenditures in years 1t , 2t  and 3t were probably affected by moral hazard and unfiled 
claims as well. This could have biased the prediction of expected expenditures in year t , since prior 
expenditures were included in our model and most of the insured with voluntary deductible d  in year 
t  had the same level of deductible in previous years. We corrected for this by multiplying the gross
expenditures in prior years by 1+ 0)(dF . This further increased the relative difference in predicted 
and gross expenditures in year t , because, obviously, expenditures in 1t , 2t  and 3t  have a 
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positive impact on (predicted) expenditures in year t . As a result, the predicted expenditures for 
insured with deductible d  were on average - a fraction 1)(dF - higher than the gross expenditures. 
Accordingly, we multiplied the (original) gross expenditures in prior years (as recorded in the data) 
by 1+ 1)(dF , and so on. This iterative process converged after 8 steps, i.e.: sdF )(  did not change 
anymore (for 8ts ).
5.3 Expected out-of-pocket expenditures
As a next step we wanted to predict the out-of-pocket expenditures due to the voluntary 
deductible. Since all the insured in the data had a mandatory deductible of CHF 230, the total 
deductible x  equaled voluntary deductible d + CHF 230. The out-of-pocket expenditures of an
individual i due to his/her total deductible x  were estimated according to equation (10).
)),(1(*)1,(*)()( , kcxkcYEOOPEE iiixi ** (10)
with
ii xc O * and ii YEk )(/ O (11)
and with (.)*  the cumulative density function of the gamma distribution with parameters c and k
(Van Vliet 1995). Equation (10) can be seen as the weighted sum of the expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures if medical expenditures are below x )),(/)1,(*)(( kckcYE iii ** and the out-of-
pocket expenditures if medical expenditures exceed x )x(  . Respectively, the weighting factors are 
),( kci* and ),(1 kci* , i.e. the probability that xY  and the probability that xY !  (Van Vliet 
1995, 2004).
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The final step in estimating the out-of-pocket expenditures diOOPEE ,)(  due to a voluntary 
deductible d  was to subtract the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to the mandatory
deductible of CHF 230 from the expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to the total deductible x .
We estimated the out-of-pocket expenditures due to the mandatory deductible the same way as the 
total out-of-pocket expenditures, with x in (10) and (11) being replaced with 230. Table 2 shows the 
average results per deductible.
The first row of table 2 shows what the expenditures of the five subgroups would have been in a 
situation without a voluntary deductible. The difference with the first row of table 1 captures both 
moral hazard and unfiled claims.
[Table 2]
5.4 The necessary expenditure reduction due to less moral hazard
As a final step we wanted to examine whether the premium rebates actually offered in 2003, could 
have been offered in the presence of perfect risk equalization. With perfect risk equalization, the 
premium rebate for a deductible can be based only on out-of-pocket expenditures and a reduction in 
moral hazard, as argued in Section 3.1. In such a situation the actual rebates found in our data could 
have been offered only if the expenditure reduction due to less moral hazard equals or exceeds the 
actual financial gain found, as follows from equation (7) and (8). Accordingly, we calculated the
(relative) necessary expenditure reduction m  according to equation (12).
dd
)Y(E/Cm        (12)
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with dC  the actual average financial gain found for the group of insured with voluntary deductible 
d  and dYE )(  the average expected total expenditures. 
6. Results
6.1 General statistics
To quantify the actual financial gain for the insured with a deductible, we first estimated the total 
expenditures and the out-of-pocket expenditures, as described in Section 5. Table 3 indicates the 
validity of the procedure used to estimate the out-of-pocket expenditures. For the insured without a 
voluntary deductible, it shows the actual values of expenditures between CHF 230 (mandatory 
deductible level) and CHF 400, 600, 1200 and 1500 (total deductible levels) and the predicted
expenditures in these intervals. Notice that for these insured the gross expenditures on top of the 
mandatory deductible of CHF 230 in year t  are not affected by unfiled claims or reductions in moral 
hazard. The predicted expenditures of these insured might be slightly affected by the corrections 
described in Section 5.2. However, the effect is negligible since these corrections were only applied 
to the gross expenditures of those with a voluntary deductible in one of the previous years; less then 3 
percent of the insured without a deductible in year t  had a voluntary deductible in 1t , 2t  and/or
3t . From table 3 it can be concluded that the predicted expenditures closely agree with the actual 
expenditures in these intervals. The distribution test mentioned in Section 5.2 revealed that for the 
normal, log-normal and Poisson distribution the correspondence between the actual and predicted 
expenditures in these intervals was substantially poorer.
[Table 3]
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6.2 Potential gain for insured without a voluntary deductible
It could easily be calculated how large the average financial gain of those without a voluntary 
deductible would have been if they had collectively chosen a voluntary deductible. This quantity, 
which we define as the potential gain, is shown in table 4. It is calculated as the average premium 
rebate that these insured would have received for voluntary deductible d  minus their average 
expected out-of-pocket expenditures due to d . This calculation ignores a possible reduction in moral 
hazard. If this would be taken into account as well then the potential gain would be even higher since 
a larger reduction in moral hazard might result in lower out-of-pocket expenditures.
From table 4 it can be concluded that on average a voluntary deductible would have been 
beneficial for these insured. Table 4 also shows the proportion of insured that would have had a 
(positive) financial gain. Of course, part of these insured knew for sure that their out-of-pocket 
expenditures would exceed the deductible amount due to a chronic illness, for instance. They were 
not likely to choose a deductible as long as the premium rebate did not (far) exceed the deductible 
amount. Nonetheless, table 4 reveals that this was definitely not the case for all the insured who did 
not choose a deductible. For 23 percent of these insured a voluntary deductible of CHF 170 would 
have been beneficial. This figure is 27 percent a voluntary deductible of CHF 370, 38 percent for a 
voluntary deductible of CHF 970 and 43 percent for a voluntary deductible of CHF 1,270. 
Apparently, these (ex-post) potential gains were not large enough to induce these insured to take a 
deductible.
[Table 4]
6.3 Actual financial gain in practice
After predicting the total expenditures for insured with voluntary deductible d  we estimated their 
out-of-pocket expenditures according to equation (10) and (11). The average actual financial gain
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could be calculated by subtracting the estimated out-of-pocket expenditures from the premium rebate 
for voluntary deductible d . Table 5 shows the average actual gain per deductible in 2003. 
We may not directly conclude that the actual financial gain exactly equals the minimum
compensation considered in Section 2. The reason is that some of the insured with deductible d
would possibly also have chosen d  in return for a lower rebate. However, we expect that the 
minimum compensation will not be far from the actual financial gain since the previous section 
revealed that a substantial number of insured did not choose a deductible while it would have yielded 
them a considerable financial advantage. 
In general terms, these results indicate that the insurer had to offer a substantial premium rebate
(relative to the out-of-pocket expenditures) to induce almost 50 percent of the insured to take a 
deductible. As described in Section 3, this is no problem in a health insurance market without perfect
risk equalization like the Swiss basic health insurance. Premium rebates in these insurance markets 
can be very high because of the effect of self selection, despite the legal restrictions on premium 
rebates.
6.4 Necessary reduction in moral hazard
If we assume risk equalization to adjust perfectly for differences in health status between the 
insured with and the insured without a voluntary deductible, the premium rebate can be based only on 
cost sharing plus the reduction in moral hazard, as argued in Section 3.1. The bottom row of table 5
shows how large the expenditure reduction due to less moral hazard had to be to offer the actual 
premium rebates (found in the data) in the presence of perfect risk equalization. The reduction is 
presented as a percentage of the average expected expenditures of the insured with d .
[Table 5]
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To offer the actual rebate found for a voluntary deductible of CHF 170, the expenditure reduction 
had to be 1.3 percent relative to the expected expenditures of these insured, ceteris paribus. For the 
groups of insured having a voluntary deductible of CHF 370, 970 or 1,270 the reductions had to be 
4.5, 20 and 48.8 percent, respectively. 
To examine whether these reductions are likely to occur, these results can be compared with the 
results discussed in Section 3.1. In the RAND-experiment an expenditure reduction of 31 percent was 
found for a 95%-coinsurance plan with a maximum on out-of-pocket expenditures of $1,000. This 
plan can be seen as a high-deductible plan with the deductible amount being 134 percent (= $1,000 / $ 
749) of the average expenditures that insured were expected to have in case of full-coverage 
(Manning et al., 1987). Van Vliet (2004) found that in the Dutch private health insurance of 1996 a 
deductible of Dfl. 1,750 led to an expenditure reduction of 14 percent. This deductible amount was
about 69 percent (= Dfl. 1,750 / Dfl. 2,548) of the average expenditures that insured were expected to 
have in case of full-coverage. 
From table 2 it can be calculated that in our data a voluntary deductible of CHF 170 is about 5 
percent (= CHF 170 / CHF 3,351) of the average expenditures that the insured with this deductible 
were expected to have in a situation without a voluntary deductible. For voluntary deductibles of CHF 
370, 970 and 1,270 these figures are 13 percent (= CHF 370 / CHF 2,929), 45 percent (= CHF 970 / 
CHF 2,136) and 92 percent (= CHF 1,270 / CHF 1,373), respectively. Comparing the necessary 
reduction with the results of Manning et al. (1987) and Van Vliet (1994), we conclude that the actual 
rebate offered for a deductible of CHF 1,270 could definitely not have been offered in the presence of 
“perfect” risk equalization. We should be careful with a conclusion regarding the deductible of CHF 
970 because of the low number of insured having that deductible in our data. Regarding the
deductibles of CHF 170 and CHF 370 we conclude that the premium rebates actually offered could 
probably also have been offered in the presence of perfect risk equalization.
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With respect to the lower deductibles, i.e. CHF 170 and CHF 370, one should notice that these 
results do not imply that a reduction of 1 percent will always be large enough to offer an attractive 
premium rebate. If the voluntary deductible of CHF 170 would have been the highest deductible 
available then the insured with voluntary deductibles of CHF 370, 970 and 1,270 in our dataset would 
presumably have taken the voluntary deductible of CHF 170. Since these insured are on average 
healthier, the average medical expenditures and average out-of-pocket expenditures in the group of 
insured with a voluntary deductible of CHF 170 would have been lower. Consequently, the necessary 
expenditure reduction would have been larger, according to equation (12).
7. Conclusion and policy implications
Theoretically, a risk avers consumer takes a voluntary deductible only if the premium rebate
exceeds his/her expected out-of-pocket expenditures, i.e. if he/she expects to obtain a financial gain. 
In our 2003-data from Switzerland we found that the actual rebates for voluntary deductible d  (far) 
exceeded the average out-of-pocket expenditures for insured with d . Moreover, our results reveal 
that a substantial number of insured did not choose a deductible although it would have yielded them 
a considerable financial advantage. This indicates that consumers demand a large financial 
compensation in order to be induced to take a (high) deductible. 
In the absence of (perfect) risk equalization insurers can offer high premium rebates due to the 
effect of self selection. We conclude that, for high deductibles, such premium rebates cannot be 
offered in the presence of “perfect” risk equalization. In such a situation numbers of insured opting 
for a high deductible will be lower and the total reduction in moral hazard will be smaller than in the 
absence of (perfect) risk equalization.
The Swiss and the Dutch 2006-equalization schemes are “imperfect”, implying that part of the 
expenditure differences between the insured with and without voluntary deductible d  can be 
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reflected in the premium rebate for d . As a result, the level of cross-subsidization between the 
healthy and the unhealthy insured is lower than in a situation with perfect risk equalization. One way 
to increase cross-subsidization would be to include the level of deductible as a risk factor in the 
equalization model. Risk equalization would then “perfectly” adjust for differences in health status 
between those who choose a deductible and those who do not. As shown in this paper, this would also 
lead to less insured choosing a deductible and a smaller reduction in moral hazard. Since the main 
goal of user charges is to reduce moral hazard, some effect of self selection on the premium rebate 
can be justified to increase the viability of voluntary deductibles.
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Figure 1 The demand for insurance (p=0.5)
 Figure 2 The maximum loading fee (p=0.5)
Figure 3 The demand for deductibles (p=0.5)
Figures
Figure 4 The minimum compensation (p=0.5)
Table 1 Mean (std dev) per deductible level in 2003 (currency = CHF; CHF 1 = € 0.63) 
x=230 x=400 x=600 x=1,200 x=1,500
d=0 d=170 d=370 d=970 d=1,270
Gross expenditures
3,874
(7,422)
2,967
(6,298)
2,457
(5,888)
1,743
(5,927)
884
(2,732)
Expenditures > CHF 1,500
2,826
(7,224)
2,020
(6,087)
1,670
(5,644)
1,184
(5,701)
489
(2,464)
Proportion of insured with 
expenditures > 1,500
0.54
(0.50)
0.46
(.50)
0.37
(0.48)
0.25
(0.43)
0.15
(0.36)
Age
59
(16)
57
(14)
54
(14)
53
(14)
48
(11)
N (total = 134,758) 71,864 30,457 11,305 3,303 17,829
Table 2 Mean (std dev) of expected (out-of-pocket) expenditures per deductible level in 2003 (currency = CHF; 
CHF 1 = € 0.63)
x=230 x=400 x=600 x=1,200 x=1,500
d=0 d=170 d=370 d=970 d=1,270
Expected expenditures E(Y)
3,876
(4,102)
3,351
(3,617)
2,929
(3,961)
2,136
(3,440)
1,373
(1,735)
Expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures due to the total
deductible x
195
(47)
314
(89)
408
(154)
596
(314)
566
(343)
Expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures due to the 
mandatory deductible
195
(47)
188
(50)
172
(58)
147
(62)
134
(61)
Expected out-of-pocket 
expenditures due to the 
voluntary deductible d
0
(0)
126
(39)
236
(96)
449
(253)
432
(285)
Tables
Table 3 Mean (std dev) of actual and predicted expenditures between CHF 230 and CHF x for the insured 
without a voluntary deductible in 2003 (N=71,864; currency = CHF; CHF 1 = € 0.63)
Actual expenditures Predicted expenditures
Between CHF 230 and 400
135
(67)
135
(36)
Between CHF 230 and 600
286
(148)
284
(79)
Between CHF 230 and 1,200
682
(403)
678
(215)
Between CHF 230 and 1,500
852
(531)
850
(284)
Table 4 Potential gain for insured without a voluntary deductible in 2003 (N=71,864; currency = CHF; CHF 1 = 
€ 0.63)
d = 170 d = 370 d = 970 d = 1,270
Premium rebate 170 367 877 1,116
Predicted expenditures between 
CHF 230 and CHF 230+d
135 284 678 850
Average potential gain 35 83 199 266
Proportion of insured with 
potential gain > 0
0.23 0.27 0.38 0.43
Table 5 Average financial gain due to voluntary deductible d for all insured with d in 2003 (currency = CHF; 
CHF 1 = € 0.63)
d = 170 d = 370 d = 970 d = 1,270
Premium rebate 170 367 877 1,116
E(OOPE)d 126 236 449 432
Average gain 44 131 427 684
Average gain as % of E(OOPE)d 35% 56% 95% 158%
Average gain as % of E(Y) 1.3% 4.5% 20.0% 48.8%
